Summary

Position: two treasury Safes supply 11.366m USDC and borrow 10.909m USDC against 7,500 wstETH in Compound Institutional. The structure also carries 9.042m USDS debt on Spark, with borrow proceeds in 9.045m syrupUSDC and 1.876m steakUSDC. Since 23 October the Spark loan shares one account, and its 8,680.17 wstETH of collateral, with the Liquity strategy’s 2,171 WETH loan.

Exit: transferring our Compound supply claim to the borrowing Safe cancels its debt internally. The fork recovered all Compound collateral even with zero pool USDC. Cash repayment followed by competing withdrawals instead left up to 4.048m USDC unavailable in the refreshed withdrawal sequence. That result established illiquidity, not permanent loss or a universal loss bound.

Dominant risk: the 3-of-4 governor can authorize transfers of custody assets without an upgrade. Pauses can obstruct repayment or collateral withdrawal; liquidation and counterparty bad debt can destroy value. At the October pin the full carry is about +72k USD a year at trailing vault yields and +17k at syrupUSDC’s forward rate; commercial rewards are excluded. The shared Spark account now reaches liquidation before Compound does, at an ETH price about 45.6% lower.

Position, rates, carry, the Spark account and liquidation distances use block 26,256,381 on October 23. Protocol-risk tests keep the September 15 evidence, and withdrawal-order and internal-cancellation tests keep block 25,989,240 on September 16.

Mechanism and true exposure

Account / venueAssets or claimsDebt
Supply Safe A — Compound11.366m USDC supply claim—
Supply Safe A — Spark, shared with the Liquity strategy8,680.17 wstETH collateral9.042m USDS for this strategy; 2,171.03 WETH for the Liquity strategy
Borrow Safe B — Compound7,500 wstETH collateral10.909m USDC
Borrow Safe B — vaults9.045m syrupUSDC; 1.876m steakUSDC, measured in underlying USDC—

Spark borrowing funds part of Safe A’s Compound supply through USDS/DAI/USDC conversion. Safe B borrows Compound USDC and holds the vault shares. This creates two loans against wstETH, two liquidation venues and a redemption dependency on the vaults. Since 23 October the Spark account also carries the Liquity strategy’s WETH loan, so the two strategies share Spark collateral, health factor and liquidation outcome.

Safe ASupplies USDC to CompoundAlso owes USDS to SparkSafe BBorrows USDC against wstETHHolds steakUSDC + syrupUSDCCompoundUSDC supply claimCompoundUSDC debt + wstETH collateralResidual USDC withdrawalRequires available pool cashSpark needs separate repaymentwstETH withdrawalAfter debt is cancelledRequires withdrawals enabled ownsowes / posts transfer claimcancels debtremaining claimdebt cleared

The diagram shows the verified structure; balances and executable scenarios are in the tables.

Compound lends USDC, while wstETH remains collateral in custody. Our supply claim also bears exposure to 6.435m USDC borrowed by others against the market’s WETH, wstETH, cbBTC and WBTC collateral set. Our own supply and borrow balances are not automatically offset across Safes.

Oracle and liquidation: wstETH is valued using Chainlink ETH/USD × the capped Lido conversion ratio; no secondary-market wstETH discount enters that feed. Borrow capacity is 85% of collateral value; liquidation begins when debt exceeds 92% of collateral value. At the October pin, the borrowing Safe’s boundary is approximately $1,580.85/wstETH, 47.2% below the $2,993.02 oracle price, holding debt and USDC price fixed. Liquidation deducts 7% of collateral valuation. Spark values wstETH at Lido’s exchange rate times an ETH/USD feed aggregated from Chronicle, Chainlink and RedStone. Its shared account, at health factor 1.532, becomes liquidatable at an ETH price of about $1,306, 45.6% lower and about $1,629 per wstETH, so it now reaches liquidation before Compound. In a fork at $1,300, a liquidator repaid 4.52m of the USDS debt and seized 2,964.60 wstETH of the shared collateral.

Net economics, benchmark and capacity

Return convention: USDC-equivalent income from Compound supply and both vaults, less Compound and Spark interest, vault fees, conversion costs and gas. Lido staking return and wstETH price changes should be shown separately when comparing leveraged carry with simply holding wstETH.

At the October 23 pin, with Comet and Spark rates as APY and vault yields as 30-day share-price growth:

LegBalanceRateUSD a year
Compound supply, Safe A11.366m USDC2.87%+326k
Compound borrow, Safe B10.909m USDC3.75%−409k
syrupUSDC, Safe B9.045m USDC5.19%+469k
steakUSDC, Safe B1.876m USDC4.50%+84k
Spark USDS borrow, Safe A9.042m USDS4.41%−399k
Net+72k

The Compound legs alone cost 83k a year; the vaults carry the return. syrupUSDC’s forward run rate, its loan book’s current issuance, is 4.58% rather than 5.19%, which cuts the net to about +17k. Vault yields are share-price growth after vault fees; gas, Safe execution and conversion costs are excluded, and the September exit test found zero PSM conversion fees. Both on-chain reward tracking speeds are zero; no commercial reward entitlement, deadline or payout is counted.

Benchmark: Sky’s savings rate on sUSDS was 3.80% APY. On the same 10.92m of vault holdings it would earn about 415k a year against the vaults’ 554k, so the vaults add about 138k a year for taking Maple and Morpho credit and liquidity risk.

Capacity: the pool held 4.768m USDC cash, with 22.060m supplied, 17.345m borrowed and 53,167 USDC reserves; utilization was 78.6%, and 60.2% without our balances. We are 51.5% of supply and 62.9% of borrowing. The wstETH cap is 12,000; 8,092.76 wstETH is posted, 92.7% of it ours, leaving 3,907 wstETH of top-up room. Adding supply or borrowing changes utilisation and both interest rates; no fixed marginal yield is assumed.

Exit, cost and latency

Internal cancellation: Safe A transfers its Compound supply claim to Safe B; Compound offsets the debt, after which Safe B withdraws its wstETH. This consumes the supply claim instead of returning its full face value in cash. Each Safe requires three owner signatures.

Cash repayment: redeem vault holdings, repay with USDC, then withdraw collateral and the supply claim. Repayment restores pool cash that other suppliers can withdraw before us.

Executed scenarioCompound wstETH recoveredRemaining Compound USDC claim unavailable
Pool cash exhausted; cancel debt internallyAll 7,500≈327k USDC
Repay with cash; nobody withdraws between our transactionsAll 7,5000
Others exhaust cash; we repay and withdraw firstAll 7,500≈327k USDC
Others exhaust cash; we repay; they withdraw again before usAll 7,500≈4.048m USDC

These refreshed withdrawal-order tests used block 25,989,240 (September 16), with no new borrowing or defaults and the necessary functions enabled. Received cash plus remaining recorded claims reconciled to the starting claim and accrued interest. See the withdrawal and protocol-risk research.

Full-structure exit: steakUSDC redeemed in one transaction. Syrup required a redemption request and Maple delegate processing; an actual large holder queueing first left our request unfunded. That blocked full Spark repayment even though Compound collateral could exit. With cooperative Syrup processing, the complete simulated unwind recovered all 14,500 posted wstETH and left approximately 2.327m USDC, consuming 2.26m gas across the component calls. PSM conversion fees were zero in that test. Safe execution overhead, live gas prices, swap execution and elapsed queue time were not established; no maximum exit latency is claimed. On 23 October syrupUSDC’s queue held 31.15m shares, about 37.06m USDC, against 11.61m USDC of pool cash, so a new request would wait behind that queue.

Risks

IDRiskMechanism and evidence
R1Administrator custody and exit controlGovernor-authorized transfers removed all 7,500 wstETH and 5.264m pool USDC in the fork. Pauses blocked repayment or collateral withdrawal, including after debt reached zero.
R2Reward dependencyBoth reward tracking speeds were zero. Commercial rewards and eligibility are excluded from verified returns.
R3Cash competition and coordinated exitsInternal cancellation worked at zero cash; cash repayment followed by competing withdrawals left 4.048m USDC illiquid in the tested sequence.
R4Liquidation and oracle dependenceAt simulated $1,590/wstETH, Compound seized all 7,500 wstETH, cleared debt and credited ≈89,008 USDC; the collateral valuation deduction was $834,750. Positive stale oracle data was accepted; a reverting feed blocked withdrawal with debt.
R5Deployed code and audit scopeThe assessed implementation matches the earlier verified runtime except its embedded asset-list address. Historical asset-extension audit coverage does not establish coverage of all institutional changes.
R6Rate changes and insufficient backingAt simulated $20,000/WBTC, one borrower’s liquidation and collateral sale left 1.059m USDC negative reserves while our displayed supply claim remained unchanged. This is a pool shortfall, not our allocated loss.
R7Spark shared account and vault dependenciesSince 23 October the Spark account shares 8,680.17 wstETH of collateral with the Liquity strategy’s 2,171.03 WETH loan; at health factor 1.532 it liquidates at an ETH fall of about 45.6%, before Compound, and a USDS liquidation in a fork seized 2,964.60 wstETH of the shared collateral. A 3-of-5 Safe can pause Spark at once, blocking repayment and collateral withdrawal. Vault redemption capacity and delegate processing constrain cash recovery: syrupUSDC’s queue held about 37.06m USDC against 11.61m of pool cash on 23 October. The carry is about +72k USD a year at trailing vault yields and +17k at syrupUSDC’s forward rate.
R8Shared treasury keys and manager permissionsBoth Safes share the same six owners and 3-signature threshold. A manager granted Comet.allow withdrew without another Safe action; the test grant was synthetic.
R9Governance and configuration changesThe observed upgrade at block 25,984,875 raised the wstETH cap from 8,000 to 12,000. Between 15 September and 23 October the implementation, the wstETH price feed and collateral settings, and the governor and proxy-owner Safe nonces were unchanged. Empty administrative Safe queues do not prevent later changes.
R10USDC issuer controlBlacklisting Comet blocked USDC repayment and withdrawal. Internal cancellation still released wstETH when Compound’s relevant functions remained enabled.

Research gaps: R1/R8: Comet.allow manager grants and proposals on the treasury Safes need separate examination. R2: commercial rewards and eligibility remain outside verified returns. R3: cash coverage after debt cancellation and the cashless exit route were separate gaps in the prior review. R4: oracle update cadence and the market discount to the oracle price remain gaps despite the acceptance of stale positive prices. R5: audit scope requires document and code review. R6/R7: borrow-rate levels, net carry, Spark pauses and freezes, vault redemption processing and credit need separate assessment. R9: Compound DAO Timelock actions include changes to the wstETH price oracle it manages.

The prior review recorded Spark health-factor reference levels of 2 and 1.5 before the account was shared; the latter is about a 3.3% ETH fall from the pin. Its syrupUSDC queue reference was 21.25m shares.

Details and assumptions: withdrawal and protocol-risk research. Historical verification preserves the thresholds and gaps recorded at that review.

Trust and control

AuthorityVerified control
Governor — 3-of-4approveThis authorizes transfers of custody tokens; can pause functions and withdraw reserves. Its three direct EOA owner keys satisfy the Safe threshold.
Proxy-admin owner — 4-of-7Replaced the implementation with mock code in one fork call. All four governor owners also belong to this Safe.
Pause guardian — 5-of-9Can block repayment, transfers or withdrawals and deactivate collateral.
Treasury — two 3-of-6 SafesIdentical owner sets; no guard or modules. Separating the positions does not diversify signer risk.
Spark — Sky governance and Freezer MomParameter, oracle and rate-model changes take effect after Sky’s 48-hour delay. A 3-of-5 Safe of wallets without contract code, Sky’s elected governance contract or Spark’s proxy can pause markets at once, blocking repayment, collateral withdrawal and liquidation. The account is shared with the Liquity strategy.

The tested administrative calls require no intervening timelock; the governor and proxy-owner Safes had no guard or modules. The oracle cap manager was the Compound DAO Timelock. The fork verified authority after impersonating callers, not actual Safe signature execution. Existing manager grants and the off-chain independence of signer custody systems were not comprehensively assessed.

Evidence boundary

Assessment pin: Ethereum 25,984,909, 15 September 2026, 19:19:47 UTC, hash 0x44d5f6e0f9189bbf1d483aef8d8f087185325cf81a2e0e0b07d272f8af1b6ec9. Protocol-risk evidence contains balances, configuration, controls, oracle and code checks, source URLs/hashes, 12 mechanism tests and the counterparty-default test.

Refreshed withdrawal pin: Ethereum 25,989,240, 16 September 2026, 09:48:23 UTC, hash 0x77d43433a4cfe3f16d51814fb552bc8a928b1511b00517d1008a6a4a4d32c776. Withdrawal evidence contains fresh balances, repayment races and internal cancellation. The broader protocol-risk and full-structure exit tests retain their original pins.

Earlier full-structure exit / vault pin: Ethereum 25,983,624, 15 September 2026, 15:01:11 UTC, hash 0x1ff67128210b667c3a217213dc3c04d78d0a43708373ff9671db6b286386e528. Vault-exit evidence contains the snapshot, vault balances, conversion fees and full-exit tests. Syrup’s stated balance comes from this earlier pin. Replay commands are in the consolidated withdrawal and protocol-risk research.

Refresh pin: Ethereum 26,256,381, 23 October 2026, 16:00:11 UTC, hash 0x2def50163c39e7433a51edd2813aa381f8625a90e9f57aaf2189675adda462ec. Refresh evidence contains both Safes’ balances and queues, Comet rates and configuration, vault prices and the syrupUSDC queue, the Spark USDS cost, the shared Spark account with its fork liquidation and controls, and the sUSDS benchmark.

Method: local Anvil forks, impersonated callers and explicitly stated price/code shocks; no live transactions. Results demonstrate conditional mechanisms, not forecasts, recovery guarantees or a comprehensive security audit. The OpenZeppelin asset-extension audit, reviewed September 15, supplies historical scope only.

Unresolved: the carry’s dependence on syrupUSDC’s trailing yield over its forward run rate; attribution of the shared Spark account and of Safe B’s steakUSDC; commercial reward terms; audit coverage of the deployed institutional changes; oracle heartbeat/deviation and executable market-price comparison; vault credit composition; complete manager-permission inventory; live exit costs and queue latency. Prior snapshots and tests remain supporting records, not competing conclusions in this memo.