Refresh, 20 October 2026 (block 26,233,101): market state, economics, the first measured exit, oracle, governance, entry permissions and a keeper-free self-run test were re-verified on-chain, superseding the 2 September figures (still pinned in snapshot.json; the refresh is in snapshot-2026-10-20.json).
Bottom line
The position is USDC deposited into a 3F (“Grunt”) Facility intent that builds a leveraged Janus Henderson Anemoy JAAA position: the protocol subscribes to the JAAA fund, wraps the shares 1:1 into a transfer-restricted wJAAA, posts them as collateral on a dedicated Morpho Blue market (98% LLTV), borrows USDC and loops to a target LTV. The depositor ends up holding the ERC-20 shares of a position manager (PM). Live PMs share one beacon: “JAAA - 3F - 8x” (87.7% target LTV), “9x” (89.1%, empty), “10x” (90.2%) and a white-label “JAAA Fission 8x” deployed on 11 September. Net return convention: leveraged spread between JAAA NAV accrual and the Morpho USDC borrow rate, minus a 10% performance fee on gains and a per-offer bridge-financing cost at entry and exit. On 20 October that spread is negative: JAAA accrued 3.46% over the trailing 30 days (4.42% over 90 days) against a 4.35% borrow rate, so the 8x book earns −2.94% on 30-day inputs and +4.45% after fees on 90-day inputs. The 3F app itself shows 8x at −3.07% and 10x at −5.39%. Closest investable benchmarks: unlevered JAAA (../janus-henderson-anemoy-jaaa/memo.md), sUSDS, and the self-managed Horizon loop (../aave-horizon-jaaa-loop/memo.md).
Immediately available exit: none. Exit is a reverse intent that only 3F’s FACILITATOR_ROLE keeper can execute, routed through the JAAA fund’s async redemption. The first full exit was measured in October: the 8x book’s main holder (99.8% of its shares) entered on 13 October 17:33 UTC and was paid $427,063.43 after 66.7 hours. The keeper pulled that intent’s start forward by 15 days to make it possible, and the bridge leg cost 2.4bp of notional, which is 17bp of the holder’s equity. The keeper sets every window, and nothing on-chain forces it to act. Every token in the chain (PM shares, wJAAA, JAAA) is transfer-restricted, so there is no secondary market and no permissionless fallback.
Dominant risk: a leveraged position whose liquidation engine is keyed to an attested NAV (Chronicle VAO, now a 4-of-8 validator quorum, with no staleness check in the Morpho oracle path) rather than a market price, and whose collateral only an allowlisted set can clear. The 10x book enters pre-liquidation at about a 3% NAV markdown. Underneath it, a single Centrifuge BalanceSheet manager key can move JAAA out of the wJAAA wrapper without 3F’s signature (base memo R6). The venue is small and shrinking: market supply fell from $5.89M at the end of September to $2.42M, with about $280K of equity across all PMs.
Unresolved before any capital decision: the Request (PT/YT) implementation, including a Request beacon that was upgraded to unverified code on 16 October; the guardian quorum on production intents; signer attribution for the Safes, the keepers and the new COMPLIANCE EOA; and NOCA’s onboarding path. The NOCA Safe is still blocked by 3F’s deposit allowlist on a fork.
Mechanism and true exposure
One unit of USDC travels: Facility intent → bridge capital → JAAA subscription → wJAAA wrap → Morpho collateral → looped USDC borrow → PM shares.
- Facility (
0x4e013CA8Ff612a58F53c822904cDd0EC538A4a4F, ERC-1967 proxy, implementation unchanged since September) is an intent-batching engine. Deposits mint ERC-6909 intent shares 1:1, and beforeresolveStartthe user can withdraw 1:1. Afterwards only an address with FACILITATOR_ROLE (four keeper contracts) can advance the intent, and users can only wait toclaima pro-rata share of whatever the intent ends up holding. Intents are now opened daily, with deposit caps the keeper updates continuously (893 cap updates since September, at most $237K). Today’s 8x, 9x and 10x USDC intents are capped at $4,000 each, and the 1x intent at $1M. No USDC entered any 8x, 9x or 10x deposit intent between 2 September and 20 October. COMPLIANCE_ROLE now has a third holder, the bare EOA0x8a58…c07c, granted on 2 October. - Bridge financing: “bridge facilitators” front USDC across the fund’s settlement window against PT/YT claim tokens under signed RFQ offers. Four live legs were measured: 2.1–3.0bp of notional for 20.7–22.3 hours, which is 8.2–12.5% annualized. The Request implementation itself is not reviewed (
UNVERIFIED). If the keeper stops acting, the intent is stranded with no timeout. - Fund leg: about ten CentrifugeFund beacon-proxy instances hold ISSUER role on wJAAA and subscribe to the JAAA ERC-7540 vault (
0x4880…780B). The Anemoy KYC relationship sits with 3F’s fund wrappers, not the end depositor. In the October exit the fund returned USDC 20.7 hours after the wJAAA was burned and redeemed. - wJAAA (
0x86b495e4Cb00AB18Ad94BFD7920479cC79E8eBFE) wraps JAAA 1:1 (verified again:JAAA.balanceOf(wJAAA)=totalSupply= 2,355,606.817414 at the pin). Anyone who holds JAAA can wrap to themselves; minting to another address needs ISSUER. Transfers revert unless the sender has SENDER_ROLE or the receiver has RECEIVER_ROLE. Morpho Blue holds only SENDER, so an outside holder cannot post wJAAA as collateral. Burning delivers JAAA, which only Anemoy-allowlisted addresses can receive. So the effective liquidator set is permissioned despite Morpho liquidation being nominally permissionless. Roles are granted by the wJAAA owner, a 2-of-3 Safe (0xA0f6…FD26) acting without a timelock; it added 13 SENDER grants in September for the Fission PM and its positions. - Morpho market
0xb55c…63e2(wJAAA/USDC, LLTV 98%, Adaptive Curve IRM): supply $2,421,496, borrow $2,185,972, utilization 90.3%, borrow APY 4.35%, idle liquidity $235,524 at the pin. The market has one lender: a single adapter of the “3F x Steakhouse USDC” Vault V2 held all supply shares except seed dust both on 2 September and on 20 October. “Presto USDC Forte” has a cap on this market but has never been allocated to it; the September memo’s “two lender vaults” was wrong. That vault withdrew $3.34M within twenty minutes of the October 8x exit. A second wJAAA/USDC market has an oracle mis-scaled by 1e12, and the raw-JAAA market’s immutable oracle prices JAAA through WBTC feeds; both are unusable and empty. - Position managers aggregate the Morpho borrow positions and issue ERC-20 shares priced at
(collateral quoted at the oracle − debt) / supply. At the pin: 8x equity $1,179 (after the main holder’s exit), 10x equity $79,996 at LTV 90.04%, 9x empty, Fission 8x equity $198,868 at LTV 87.57% with its own TransferGuard (0xe154…12ab). Fees and thresholds are unchanged on every PM: performance fee 10%,safeLtv93%,liquidationLtv98%, with 3F’s proportional pre-liquidation between them and native Morpho liquidation beyond. PM share transfers pass a TransferGuard (0x8096…4622), which the fork test shows is an address allowlist.
Oracle path (the load-bearing feed): Morpho reads a standard MorphoChainlinkOracleV2 (0x2E4e…D886) → single feed ChronicleVAO_Centrifuge_JAAA_ChainlinkAdapter_1 (0x5A4B…ed04) → UScribeRouter (0x5D44…89C8) → UScribe VAO::Centrifuge_JAAA (0x02cf…8eC0). The quorum changed on 3 September: 17 validators were dropped and both bars raised, so it is now 4 of 8 for Schnorr and ECDSA (was 2 of 25). Pokes land about every 6.2 hours. The published value equals the vault’s pricePerShare() (1.052831 on both), so the 2bp premium seen in September is gone. No layer of this path checks staleness: the adapter hardcodes roundId = 1 and MorphoChainlinkOracleV2 ignores updatedAt. Reads are toll-permissioned, so de-tolling the Morpho oracle would make every price read revert and brick the market. The NAV root remains Anemoy’s single pool-manager EOA.
Label-versus-exposure gap: “leveraged JAAA” is really AAA-CLO credit at 8–10x through four wrap layers (JAAA → wJAAA → Morpho collateral → PM share). Exit liveness depends on a 3F keeper and the Anemoy redemption EOA, solvency-relevant pricing depends on Chronicle’s attestation of a NAV that Anemoy alone produces, and the wrapper’s backing can be moved by a Centrifuge BalanceSheet manager key. Leverage layers between root and position: the CLO waterfall (inherent to the asset) plus one on-chain borrow loop. The PM socializes losses across all holders of the same share class, and claim has no minimum-out protection.
Running the same loop without 3F
A fork at block 26,233,101 tested whether a KYC’d JAAA holder could run this loop directly on 3F’s Morpho market, with no Facility or keeper. The actor was Grove’s ALMProxy, a JAAA member with no wJAAA role.
| Step | As deployed | With SENDER granted on the fork |
|---|---|---|
| Wrap JAAA → wJAAA | Succeeds | Succeeds |
supplyCollateral wJAAA | Reverts: Unauthorized() (0x82b42900) inside the wJAAA transfer | Succeeds |
| Borrow $100K USDC | Reverts: no collateral | Succeeds; $500K more reverts on liquidity |
Repay, withdrawCollateral, unwrap | n/a | All succeed; the actor ends where it started |
| Raw JAAA into the raw-JAAA market | Reverts: TransferBlocked() (Morpho is not a JAAA member) | Not tested; that market’s WBTC-based oracle makes it unusable anyway |
A self-run loop on this venue therefore needs two permissions held by others: JAAA membership from Anemoy (the NOCA Safe is not a member) and SENDER_ROLE from the wJAAA owner Safe, which can grant it without a timelock. With both, entry and exit need no keeper. It would still draw on the same $235,524 idle pool from a single vault, carry the 98% LLTV and the Chronicle path (R2, R3), and lack 3F’s pre-liquidation, which is PM logic. The self-managed alternative that needs no 3F permission is Aave Horizon (../aave-horizon-jaaa-loop/memo.md).
Net economics, benchmark and capacity
Return legs (measured at block 26,233,101 unless noted):
- Organic: JAAA NAV accrual, floating AAA-CLO carry.
pricePerShare()growth annualizes to 3.46% over 30 days, 4.42% over 90 days and 4.33% over 180 days. The fund printed its first NAV declines on 29 September to 1 October (−8.3bp in total). The app’s “base APY” now reads 2.85% (methodology not disclosed). - Cost, borrow: Morpho USDC borrow APY 4.35%. The weekly path since September: 3.84% (09-02), 3.72%, 3.75%, 4.00% from 23 September, and 4.36% from 14 October, with utilization held at 88–90%. The spread is −0.89 points on 30-day inputs. The carry is floating-on-floating and inverted with no position change.
- Cost, fees: performance fee 10% of NAV gains, management fee 0, fee recipient the 3F 4-of-7 Safe (re-read on every PM). Caps in code: at most 2% management and 50% performance, owner-settable without a timelock. Bridge financing: 2.1–3.0bp per day-long leg at entry and exit (measured on four legs; no on-chain bound).
- No subsidy or reflexive leg. No token emissions anywhere in the chain.
| Measure | 8x (L = 8.16) | 10x (L = 10.2) |
|---|---|---|
| 30-day JAAA inputs | −2.94% | −4.76% |
| 7-day JAAA inputs (3.84%) | +0.14% after fee | −0.89% |
| 90-day JAAA inputs (4.42%) | +4.45% after fee | +4.58% after fee |
| Break-even borrow rate, 30-day inputs | 3.94% | 3.83% |
| 2 September memo (for reference) | ≈14.5% after fee | ≈19.3% gross |
Arithmetic: at leverage L = 1/(1−LTV), equity carry ≈ base×L − borrow×(L−1). Each 10bp of spread compression costs 70–90bp of equity return.
Capacity: a single vault supplies the market. New borrowing above about $236K reverts with InsufficientLiquidity (fork, block 26,233,101), which caps new 8x equity at about $33K unless the curator allocates more; the vault’s cap on this market (25M) is not what binds. Marginal capital moves the adaptive IRM immediately. NOCA-scale capital would be the market.
Exit, cost and latency
Primary (only) path: deposit PM shares into an exit intent → keeper pulls bridge USDC → repays Morpho debt, withdraws wJAAA, burns to JAAA → requestRedeem at the Centrifuge vault → Anemoy pool-manager EOA approves and USDC settles → USDC repays the bridge → intent resolves → user claims pro rata.
Measured October exit (8x, intent #12088):
| Time (UTC) | Event |
|---|---|
| 10-13 17:33 | 413,282 PM shares (99.8% of 8x) enter the exit intent; the keeper moves its start from 10-29 to 10-14 |
| 10-14 17:49 | Request fronts $3,013,924.57; PM repays $3,013,658.09 of debt and releases 3,270,621.30 wJAAA to a CentrifugeFund |
| 10-15 14:31 | Fund returns $3,441,444.98 (20.7h; realized NAV 1.052230) |
| 10-15 15:34 | Bridge repaid $3,014,648.02; intent resolves (46.0h) |
| 10-16 12:16 | Holder paid $427,063.43 (66.7h end to end; bridge cost $723.46) |
A 10x holder exited on the same timeline. Fund settlement itself stayed fast through October (median 0.10 days, all 11 redemption requests fulfilled since 3 September), so the latency floor is set by 3F’s keeper and intent windows. There is no deadline, penalty or permissionless fallback at any step.
What can strand the position (verified in source by the September review):
- Every post-lock step including
resolveitself is FACILITATOR_ROLE-only; keeper inaction freezes the cohort indefinitely. pauseFor(owner or any of three COMPLIANCE holders, one of them a bare EOA since 2 October) blocks claims, withdrawals and even intent-share transfers; duration up to permanent (uint40.max).- Pre-resolution, the Facility owner can
revertDepositto an arbitrary receiver, an explicit compliance and seizure hook. - The PM TransferGuard can block share transfers; wJAAA and JAAA restrictions close every secondary route.
Concurrent-exit / stress behavior: a NAV markdown of d multiplies into equity as roughly L×d and moves LTV to LTV/(1−d). Pre-liquidation (93%) triggers at d ≈ 5.7% for the 8x book and d ≈ 3.0% for the 10x book; native Morpho liquidation (98%, 2% bonus) at d ≈ 10.5% and 8.0%. A Mar-2020-style AAA-CLO markdown (3–5% at the next NAV print, per the base memo’s uncited but plausible figures) puts a 10x book into pre-liquidation deleveraging through a permissioned liquidator set, realizing roughly L×d of equity (30–50% at 10x). No liquidation or pre-liquidation occurred between 2 September and 20 October, through the −8.3bp September markdown.
Lender-side run: the vault can withdraw only idle USDC instantly; beyond that it pushes utilization above target and the IRM ratchets the borrow rate until borrowers repay. October showed the calm-market version: the 8x holder repaid $3.01M and the vault withdrew $3.34M within twenty minutes.
Risks
Verified on-chain 2026-09-02 (block 25,888,786): market params, oracle chain, wJAAA role table, PM fees and thresholds, governance graph, transfer-gate simulations, NAV series. Re-verified 2026-10-20 (block 26,233,101): market and lender state, borrow-rate path, PM state, Chronicle quorum and value, wJAAA backing and role history, Timelock activity, Safe thresholds, Facility roles and intents, the October exit trace and bridge legs, entry and self-run fork tests (snapshot-2026-10-20.json). Request (PT/YT) and CentrifugeFund implementations, the upgraded beacon’s new implementation, TransferGuard internals and live intent quorums NOT reviewed. Rows import the base JAAA memo where noted.
| ID | Risk | Mechanism and evidence |
|---|---|---|
| R1 | Exit liveness monopoly: one keeper role, pausable claims, no timeout | All intent progression after lock, including resolve, is FACILITATOR_ROLE-only (Facility source, implementation 0xaf89…e7e, unchanged); four keeper contracts hold the role. The keeper sets intent windows at will: in October it moved an exit intent’s start forward by 15 days. COMPLIANCE or the owner can pauseFor claims permanently, and COMPLIANCE gained a third holder on 2 October, the bare EOA 0x8a58…c07c (owner UNVERIFIED). The owner can redirect pre-resolution deposits (revertDeposit). Guardian quorum protecting setFund/setRequest/swap can be 0 per intent; live intent quorums UNVERIFIED. Trigger: keeper inaction >48h on a pending exit, any pauseFor, any COMPLIANCE or FACILITATOR grant, any updateTarget/setRequest on an intent we hold. |
| R2 | Leveraged liquidation keyed to an attested NAV, with a permissioned liquidator set | LLTV 98%, pre-liquidation from 93% on every PM (re-verified). The 10x book pre-liquidates at about a 3% NAV markdown, 8x at about 5.7%, inside a Mar-2020-shaped CLO markdown. Unwrapping seized wJAAA requires Anemoy KYC, so clearing capacity under stress is a handful of allowlisted actors redeeming through the same operator-gated fund path. Loss is roughly L×d realized at the marked-down NAV, socialized across PM shareholders; claim has no min-out. No liquidation occurred through the first NAV down-prints (−8.3bp, late September). Trigger: PM LTV above safeLtv; Chronicle value −1.5% in 24h. |
| R3 | Oracle chain: 4-of-8 Chronicle quorum, no staleness enforcement, toll-gated reads, NAV root = one EOA | UScribe VAO::Centrifuge_JAAA bars were raised from 2 to 4 and the validator set cut from 25 to 8 on 2026-09-03 by an authed Chronicle address (verified at both blocks). Chronicle governance can still lift or drop validators and re-point the router (setUScribe). The adapter hardcodes round fields and MorphoChainlinkOracleV2 never checks age, so a stale or false NAV prices both liquidations and PM share mints and burns. De-tolling the oracle bricks the market. The underlying NAV publisher is still the single Anemoy EOA, whose vault prints lagged up to 118 hours between September and October (median 46.5h) even as redemption fulfillment stayed fast. Trigger: Chronicle poke age >36h; router setUScribe; bar or validator-set change; |
| R4 | Governance: 24h timelock to upgrade everything, controlled by a 2-of-3 with one bare-EOA signer | wJAAA proxy, Facility proxy, and the CentrifugeFund, PositionManager and Request beacons upgrade via one Solady Timelock (0xC1ab…6fA5, minDelay 86,400s) whose ADMIN/PROPOSER/CANCELLER is a 2-of-3 Safe (0xA9F5…bA24; signers: bare EOA 0xe9DB…eCe2, smart-account proxy 0xe8B5…C14e, 4-of-7 Safe 0xC820…5d60; unchanged). The trigger fired in October: a proposal on 15 October, executed on 16 October, upgraded beacon 0x9012…240c (previously “MorphoFlashLoanRequest”) to implementation 0xC147…8e46, whose source is not verified; which contracts that beacon serves is UNVERIFIED. The PM and wJAAA owner (2-of-3 Safe 0xA0f6…FD26) sets fees, target LTV, rebalancer budget, the TransferGuard and wJAAA roles without a timelock; one of its signers, Safe 0x827e…eCdB, moved from 2-of-7 to 3-of-9. Signer-org attribution (3F vs Steakhouse) UNVERIFIED. Trigger: any Timelock proposal; any setFeeData/setLtv/setRebalanceConfig/role change; threshold or owner change on the Safes above. |
| R5 | Borrow-side fragility: one curator vault is the entire lender base; the carry has inverted | All supply comes from one adapter of “3F x Steakhouse USDC” (verified at both pins; the September memo’s second lender never allocated). Utilization holds near 90%, and idle liquidity is $235,524. The borrow rate rose to 4.35% while JAAA’s 30-day carry fell to 3.46%, so the levered carry is negative, and the vault withdrew $3.34M as soon as the 8x book repaid. Trigger, firing on 2026-10-20: borrow APY > trailing-30d JAAA carry. Also: utilization >95% for 6h; the vault cutting its allocation cap. |
| R6 | Underlying JAAA risk imports wholesale, now including a single-key path to the wrapper’s backing | Single-EOA NAV, redemption and KYC gate, custody opacity, CLO mark-to-market and anchor-holder concentration: see ../janus-henderson-anemoy-jaaa/memo.md R1–R6. Its new R6 applies directly here: a Centrifuge BalanceSheet manager (one is a bare EOA, 0x42b7…208f) can move JAAA out of any non-endorsed holder without its signature, and the wJAAA wrapper is not endorsed. A fork at block 26,233,101 moved JAAA out of wJAAA this way, which would leave wJAAA under-backed and the Morpho collateral overvalued. The ETH-leg JAAA supply fell 35% month on month (to 278.5M), mostly through that manager moving and burning the anchor holder’s shares; 2.36M JAAA now sits in wJAAA. |
Trust and control
- Funds (theft / unbacked value): 1. A single Centrifuge BalanceSheet manager key, or the Anemoy NAV EOA after appointing one, can move JAAA out of the wJAAA wrapper (fork-verified, base memo R6). On 3F’s own side, 2 signers of the Timelock-controlling Safe (
0xA9F5…bA24, threshold 2, one signer a bare EOA) can queue and, after 24h, execute an upgrade of wJAAA, the Facility or the PM beacons that drains all collateral; the 24h window is the only defense, and CANCELLER sits with the same Safe. A parallel path needs 4 of 8 Chronicle validators to sign a false NAV that mis-prices liquidations and PM share mints. - Liveness (freeze / forced exit): 1 — any of: the FACILITATOR keeper set going idle, one of three COMPLIANCE holders (one a bare EOA) pausing the Facility, or the Anemoy pool-manager EOA stalling redemptions.
- The Morpho market itself is immutable (no owner), and wJAAA backing is exactly 1:1 today. The trust concentrates in the wrapper governance, the keeper, the oracle, the fund’s manager keys and the single lender.
Evidence boundary
Pinned and reproducible: Ethereum block 25,888,786 (2026-09-02) in snapshot.json, and block 26,233,101 (2026-10-20 10:08:59 UTC, hash 0xc116…1f8c) in snapshot-2026-10-20.json, both via cast and $ETH_RPC_URL. The October snapshot holds market and lender state, the weekly borrow path, PM state, oracle quorum, Timelock and role events, the exit trace and bridge legs, and the anvil fork results for NOCA entry (with a positive control) and the self-run loop. Contract sources come from Blockscout verified listings (WrappedAsset, Facility, PositionManager, MorphoChainlinkOracleV2, Chronicle adapter, router and UScribe, Solady Timelock, ERC1967Factory, Centrifuge BalanceSheet and hooks).
External inputs: Morpho API (api.morpho.org/graphql, market list and positions; 2026-10-20). app.3f.xyz asset page (2026-09-02 and 2026-10-20: base 2.85%, borrow 3.98%, 8x −3.07%, 10x −5.39%, daily cycle; private-beta UI, methodology undisclosed). docs.3f.xyz (mechanism, bridge facilitators, pre-liquidation). Audits in 3FLabs/grunt: ChainSecurity ×2 (2026-04), Cantina (2026-05 and 2026-09) and a Cantina fee review (2026-05). The Block on the $4M raise and backers (Morpho, Steakhouse, F-Prime, Maven 11, et al.).
Unresolved (falsifiable, before any capital decision):
- The Request/PT-YT implementation, and what upgraded beacon
0x9012…240cand its new unverified implementation serve. Bridge cost is now measured on four legs (2.1–3.0bp per day-long leg); its stress behavior is not. - Guardian quorum values on production intents (quorum-0 collapses the keeper-abuse protections).
- Attribution of the governance Safes, the four keeper contracts, the new COMPLIANCE EOA
0x8a58…c07cand the “Fission” operator; whether the bare-EOA Timelock signer is MPC-custodied. - Chronicle VAO validator identities after the September cut to eight.
- Closed 2026-09-03 (was: the weekly-cycle and T+1 claims). The fund fulfills in hours to days, and 3F now runs daily intents; the first measured end-to-end exit took 66.7 hours, set by the keeper’s windows.
- NOCA onboarding. The PM TransferGuard is an address allowlist (fork: the NOCA Safe and a fresh account revert with
TransferBlocked, prior holders succeed); how addresses are added isUNVERIFIED. - Whether the wJAAA owner Safe would grant SENDER_ROLE to an outside borrower, which is the only permission 3F holds over a keeper-free self-run on this market.
Supporting evidence
Live positions (block 26,233,101): JAAA-8X collateral $9,436, debt $8,257, LTV 87.5%, equity $1,179. JAAA-10X collateral $802,950, debt $722,954, LTV 90.0%, equity $79,996. JAAA Fission 8x collateral $1,599,946, debt $1,401,078, LTV 87.6%, equity $198,868. JAAA-9X empty. At block 25,888,786 the 8x book held 3,252,558 wJAAA against $2,980,131 of debt, with $427,651 of equity.
Market path (archive reads, weekly): supply / borrow / borrow APY were $4.28M / $3.85M / 3.84% on 09-02, peaked at $5.89M / $5.30M / 4.00% on 09-30, and stood at $2.42M / $2.19M / 4.35% on 10-20 after the 8x exit. Utilization stayed at 88–90%.
JAAA NAV (pricePerShare()): 1.026155 (block 24,599,986) → 1.047512 (25,888,786) → 1.049894 (26,018,028) → 1.052831 (26,233,101). Vault priceLastUpdated lag, sampled every 12 hours from 2 September: median 46.5h, maximum 118.4h. Chronicle VAO pokes: 184 events in 47.8 days.
wJAAA role table (full RolesUpdated replay from deployment): ISSUER = ten CentrifugeFund beacon proxies; SENDER includes Morpho Blue, the PMs, borrow positions, MorphoRebalancer 0x882f…e096, the owner Safe and, since September, the Fission PM, its borrow position and its retargeter; RECEIVER = Facility only. Facility roles at the pin: FACILITATOR ×4, GUARDIAN ×2, COMPLIANCE ×3 (including the 4-of-7 Safe and the bare EOA 0x8a58…c07c).
Fund redemption latency (measured 2026-09-03 over blocks 24,606,331→25,896,331): 43/43 redemption requests fulfilled, median 0.27d, max 3.22d; deposits n = 83, median 0.61d, max 4.18d. From block 25,896,331 to 26,233,101: redemptions 11/11, median 0.10d, max 0.87d; deposits 33/33, median 0.20d, max 0.93d.